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CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN DOUBTS ABOUT
THE RESURRECTION
James A. Keller

In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Stephen Davis argues that it is rational for
supernaturalists, though not for naturalists, to believe in the resurrection of 1esus Christ
in (roughly) the sense of an event which happened to 1esus in which 1esus, though he
had truly died, was restored to life and consciousness and after which his living body
left the tomb. After making some clarifications regarding supernaturalism and the concept
of a miracle, I argue that Davis has not shown this. My case against Davis rests essentially
on two claims: (I) we cannot today reconstruct what the resurrection involved because
there is no clear, historically reliable account of what the resurrection was thought to be
by those who directly experienced the Easter event; and (2) we do not have sufficient
evidence to make it rational to believe that the resurrection is part of a pattern of nonnatural
events in which God has acted for similar ends, yet belief that there is such a pattern is
needed if belief in the resurrection in Davis' sense is to be rational

In a recent issue of this journal Stephen Davis discusses whether or not it is
possible for a person of today rationally to believe that Jesus was resurrected
from the dead. 1 Although nowhere in the article does Davis explain just what
he understands the resurrection to have been, his comments at various points in
the article suggest that by 'resurrection' Davis is referring to an event which
happened to Jesus (and not just to his followers) in which Jesus, though he had
truly died, was restored to life and consciousness and after which his living body
left the tomb. He answers his question by claiming that it can be rational so to
believe and also rational not so to believe; conversely, neither position can be
shown to be irrational. Davis explains that this apparently paradoxical conclusion
occurs because of the different world-views which believers and non-believers
accept, in terms of which their judgments about the rationality of believing in
the resurrection are determined (p. 147).
I have considerable sympathy with Davis' overall approach and with many of
his conclusions. It seems to me correct to say that the rationality of particular
beliefs is relative to the world-views of the people who hold those beliefs.
Whether or not the world-views themselves are subject to rational assessment is
an issue which Davis does not discuss in his paper. I am inclined to think that
they are, but their assessment is so complex and difficult that it would be very
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difficult to show that any of a number of well-articulated world-views is irrational.
Hence, 1 am inclined to accept Davis' claim that soft apologetics (showing that
Christian belief is rational) is both possible and useful, but hard apologetics
(showing that unbelief is irrational) is at best an unpromising undertaking (p. 147).
Within this overall approach, Davis distinguishes between supernaturalism, a
Christian world-view within which the resurrection (and other miracles) can
rationally be believed to have occurred, and naturalism, a non-Christian worldview within which it is rational to believe that the resurrection did not occur (p.
154). Davis tends to categorize professed Christians who interpret the resurrection
as not involving the restoration of Jesus to life as basically naturalists, who are
also theists (p. 156). It is here that my differences with Davis become significant.
1 believe that the problems with showing that it is rational to believe that the
resurrection in something like Davis' sense actually occurred are much more
numerous and complex than Davis suggests. Davis seems to think that the most
serious bar to believing that the resurrection (in his sense) occurred is the difficulty
in accepting the occurrence of a miracle; the problems about the clarity and
historical reliability of the New Testament documents-documents on which (I
take it) he relies-receive only scant mention and no discussion. But I believe
that these problems by themselves constitute a serious bar to believing in the
resurrection (in his sense);2 moreover, they can be shown to exist even when
one accepts epistemological principles which Davis accepts and even when one
does not rule out a priori the possibility of miracles. In particular I want to
highlight two sorts of problems: (1) we cannot today reconstruct what the resurrection involved because there is no clear, historically reliable account of what
the resurrection was thought to be by those who directly experienced the Easter
event; and (2) we do not have sufficient evidence to make it rational to believe
that the resurrection is part of a pattern of nonnatural events in which God has
acted for similar ends, yet belief that there is such a pattern is needed if belief
in the resurrection in Davis' sense is to be rational.
Most of the balance of this paper is devoted to explicating and defending these
claims. In so doing, 1 will inevitably have to draw on the results of current
research into the New Testament accounts of the resurrection, but I intend (to
try) not to use any results which presuppose a commitment to naturalism. But
they do presuppose a commitment to certain canons of rationality in historical
investigations--e.g., (1) that eyewitness accounts are generally more reliable
than second- or third-hand accounts, (2) that of two accounts of an event, the
earlier one is generally to be preferred over the later one, (3) that independent
testimonies which agree are generally more credible than either one alone or
than the two testimonies would be if one were dependent on the other, and (4)
that it is in general possible to discern on author's purposes in writing a work
and that it is legitimate to use an understanding of these purposes in assessing
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the reliability of the work. Perhaps none of these canons holds without exception,
but all of them are employed by historians in assessing accounts of clearly
non-miraculous events; thus, the use of canons such as these would not seem to
prejudice the case one way or the other. And if there are not any neutral canons
such as these, then any purported assessment of the rationality of believing in
the resurrection in Davis' sense is only a sham.
Naturalism, Supernaturalism, and Miracles

Before turning to my two main claims, however, some further discussion of
Davis' distinction between naturalism and supernaturalism is necessary. Davis
defines naturalism as the belief that nature (1) alone exists, (2) is uncreated, (3)
is uniform, and (4) consists wholly of events which are explicable by methods
similar to those used in the natural sciences. Supernaturalism is the belief that
(1) something besides nature exists (God), (2) nature depends on God for its
existence, (3) the regularity of nature can be and occasionally is interrupted by
miraculous acts of God, and (4) such events are humanly quite unpredictable
and inexplicable (p. 154). The latter definition presupposes that it is possible to
make a sharp distinction between natural processes and miraculous events, though
the attempt to do so encounters serious problems.
Some indication of the problems can be gathered if we consider Davis' distinction between hard and soft miracles.
A soft miracle ... is a miracle which religious skeptics can consistently
agree has occurred; it is just that they will disagree with religious
believers on its cause and meaning. If Jones, apparently doomed with
cancer, is after prayer and fasting found to be well and free of cancer,
this may well constitute a soft miracle. Skeptics can consistently agree
that Jones was gravely ill but now is well-they will simply deny that
Jones' recovery was due to God. A hard miracle, on the other hand,
is one which is very difficult for religious skeptics to explain naturalistically and so skeptics will not wantto allow that it has occurred. (p. 152)
Davis goes on to say that the resurrection (that is, as he understands it) is a hard
miracle; skeptics argue that it has not occurred rather than try to explain it
naturalistically.
Hard miracles are events which seem to defy naturalistic explanation. Soft
miracles, however, do not seem to defy naturalistic explanation, perhaps because
we do not know enough about the event or the processes involved to determine
that they do not accord with naturalistic processes as we understand them. But
if one does not have good reason to think that a naturalistic explanation could
not be given (as one typically does not, in regard to soft miracles), why should
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one resort to a nonnaturalistic explanation? Da vis himself admits that our prejudice
should always be toward a naturalistic explanation; we should accept a nonnaturalistic explanation only when nothing else seems adequate. 3 The very fact
that an unbeliever could accept the fact that Jones had recovered while not
accepting the resurrection would suggest that Jones' recovery is no strong indication that a miraculous event has occurred. Thus, it would seem that on Davis'
own principles the only sort of event which could provide rational ground for
belief that a miracle had occurred would be a well documented hard miracle.
Although Davis does give us a way to distinguish between hard and soft
miracles, he does not discuss why an unbeliever would have trouble giving a
naturalistic explanation of some events and not others. I suspect that the reason
is that we have a good understanding of the natural processes involved in the
former and that the laws which operated in the former seem rather deterministic,
not statistical; neither of these conditions is true of the events involved in soft
miracles. Contrast Jones' recovery from cancer with Jesus' resurrection. We are
far from a complete understanding of the processes involved in the progress and
remission of cancer; surprises happen often. But we are far more familiar with
the processes involved in the degeneration of tissue after death; aside from a
few disputed cases like Jesus, there are no surprises in post-mortem developments.
Now, if I am correct about the reason for the distinction between hard and soft
miracles, then the line between them will change with the progress of human
knowledge: as knowledge grows, the scope for hard miracles will also grow.
There is also the problem of explicating the distinction between God's relation
to non-miraculous events and God's relation to miraculous events. The necessity
for such an explication arises from the fact that a miraculous event must be one
which is caused by God in some special sense. 4 But the idea of a 'special sense'
requires some ordinary sense with which it can be contrasted. Only if one draws
the distinction between these two senses in which God is related to events can
one sustain the sharp distinction between miraculous and nonmiraculous events
which Davis' approach presupposes. -' For only if this distinction can be explicated
can the distinction between the regularity of nature and its interruption be explicated; and without the latter, there is no basis for the part of distinction between
naturalism and supernaturalism indicated in points (3) and (4) of their definitions.
And without that distinction, one is left with what Davis called the "basically
naturalist" position of people like Bultmann (p. 156, his italics).
Thus, the distinction between naturalism and supernaturalism raises problems
which need further work. But in what follows I shall try to work with the
distinction in Davis' sense with one exception. I shall assume that there is a God
who can interrupt the order of nature, but I shall not assume that God has done
so. The evidence that God has done so would, as I have argued, have to come
from well documented hard miracles. And the resurrection is probably one of
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the best documented instances of a possible hard miracle. So we shall look at
the evidence for it with the assumption of supernaturalism in this sense. 6 If a
good case for a hard miracle cannot be made in relation to the resurrection of
Jesus, it is doubtful that it can be made at all.
Before examining that case, one more thing must be said about the resurrection
as a hard miracle. Thus far I have been treating the resurrection in Davis' sense
as an example of a hard miracle, and throughout most of his article Davis so
treats it. But there is one point at which he seems willing to accept another way
of conceptualizing the resurrection. There he claims that its being a miracle is
not the crucial point; in response to the objection that laws of nature are human
descriptions of observed regularities, he grants that in this sense it is not necessary
that events such as the resurrection be inexplicable naturalistically. He writes:
For Christians won't mind one bit if it turns out, through some sound
process of reasoning, that no miracles occur, i.e. that no true natural
laws are ever violated but rather that some weak ones are just occasionally
discovered to be inadequate. As long as it is still true, for example,
that Jesus was born of a virgin, was raised from the dead, healed people,
turned water into wine, etc., it will be a matter of profound indifference
to them whether natural laws are ever violated. (p. 151)
This, however, is not Davis' basic position, but rather a concession to a possible
objection based on an understanding of natural laws as purely (summary) descriptions of what has occurred.
Nevertheless, because of the importance which I understand Davis to be giving
to the distinction between naturalistic and nonnaturalistic explanations, I must
say something more about this matter. Of course, if laws of nature are understood
as merely descriptions of observed regularities, then no event can ever violate
a (correct) law of nature, and an event which seemed to do so would ipso facto
show that supposed law of nature to be incorrect. But it seems to me that we
require more of a law of nature than merely that it be a correct description of
observed regularities; it must integrate with other laws of nature and must not
contain references to named particulars. (E.g., the following would not be an
acceptable candidate for a law of nature: "When a human being dies, he remains
dead unless he is Jesus of Nazareth.") These further requirements for a law of
nature enable us to see that an event could occur which would furnish rational
grounds for believing that it required a nonnaturalistic explanation. For example,
suppose that we had a system of interrelated proposed laws of nature which we
had very good grounds to take to be correct (such as the laws which describe
certain of the physiological processes of living organisms and the physiological
changes which occur upon the death of an organism) and that we had one well
confirmed exception to these laws (such as the resurrection of Jesus) which
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continued to defy sUbsumption under any set of laws which we could formulate;
then we might well want to conclude that the explanation of that event must be
nonnaturalistic (though some people might want to continue to hope that a
naturalistic explanation would eventually be found).
On the other hand, if we found a naturalistic explanation of the event-i.e.,
if we were able to formulate a satisfactory set of laws under which the event
could be subsumed-then we would have no miracle and that event would give
us no reason to believe that God acts in miraculous ways. And if the resurrection
could be so explained, what would become of Davis' position? What is crucial
to Christianity as Davis understands it? That Jesus came back to life perhaps
through some process which we do not yet understand but which, if we did
understand, we might well duplicate and thereby restore many people, even
perhaps everyone, to life?" Or that Jesus was restored to life in a way which
never will be explained naturalistically (because it was done by God)? The answer
to this question is not clear in his paper. The passage on p. 151 might seem to
suggest that the former would be enough. But I think not. For if that were to
occur, then Bultmann might well be able to agree that Jesus had been raised
from the dead, but he still would not be a supernaturalist. Indeed, the basic
difference between Davis and his opponents would vanish. Thus I conclude that
the impossibility of a naturalistic explanation of the resurrection is crucial to
Davis' position, and I will so assume in the remainder of this paper.
I have argued that Davis is committed to the idea that Jesus' resurrection is
a hard miracle, an event which cannot be explained naturalistically. But why
should one so understand the resurrection? Certainly it has been so understood
by many Christians, but what sort of reasons might support the rationality of so
understanding it? One such reason might be a claim that this was the way in
which the first Christians understood it or that this is the most plausible way to
understand what they said about it. Let us see what evidence there is for such
a claim.
What Is The Resurrection?

Our basic questions in this section are these: what was the original understanding of Jesus' resurrection by those involved in the Easter event, and what
conclusions about the resurrection can we draw from their understanding? To
answer the first question, we need to discover what was believed about the
resurrection by those involved in the Easter event at about the time they first
believed,8 not those who were converted through their ministry nor even they
themselves several years later. Any historian would have to regard the ideas of
the people in these latter categories as less reliable testimony regarding what the
resurrection involved than the contemporary testimony of those involved in the
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event. Of course, the ideas of people in the latter categories may coincide with
the ideas of the very earliest believers, but the historian cannot assume this; she
must look for the understanding of those involved in the Easter event at about
the time they first believed. 9 (Again I might comment that this preference for
the ideas of the very earliest believers has nothing to do with the sort of event
in question; a historian would have a similar preference for the contemporary
testimony of those involved in any event.)
How then did the original believers in the resurrection understand this event?
When we attempt to answer this question, we discover something which is
disturbing to a historian: according to any records which Christians accept (or
are known to any historians, for that matter), there were no eyewitnesses to the
resurrection itself. (There were eyewitnesses to the resurrected Jesus, but not to
the event of Jesus being resurrected.) Therefore, to say that Jesus was resurrected
is to express the conclusion of an inference, either based solely on the claims
that certain people saw the Risen Lord or based on these claims and also on the
story of the empty tomb. 10 Indeed, from a historian's standpoint the situation is
even worse than that. We do not even have any contemporary accounts of either
the appearances of the resurrected Jesus or of the seeing of the empty tomb
written by eyewitnesses.!! All we have is other people's accounts of what the
eyewitnesses purportedly saw, and these accounts are typically sketchy and were
written many years later. Thus, the historian who wants to understand what the
resurrection event was must use later, sketchy, second-hand accounts of what
the eyewitnesses saw, and from these accounts he must try to determine what
the resurrection event was. These points about the only available basis for constructing a historical understanding of the resurrection do not in any way presuppose naturalism, yet they seem to me to have the important consequence that
we cannot arrive at a historically reliable understanding of what the very earliest
believers understood by the event which they (and we) name by the word 'resurrection.' Let me explain why.
First, we should note that 'resurrection' is not a term which refers to a process
with which we or they were familiar in the way in which we and they are familiar
with, e.g., the process referred to as crucifixion. The latter process has occurred
many times and can (in principle at least) be studied. The only instance of a
resurrection of which we know is Jesus', so we must learn what it involved by
looking at it, not by reflecting on the term, as we could if it referred to a process
with which we are familiar. Moreover, the early Christians spoke of Jesus'
resurrection not because they has seen it occur, but because of other experiences
which certain Christians had had (being appeared to by Jesus and possibly seeing
his empty tomb). Thus, to determine the original understanding of the resurrection, we must look at the eyewitnesses' understanding of the experience( s) which
led them to speak of it. But on this matter our lack of demonstrably reliable
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eyewitness accounts is crucial.
Look first at what is said about the appearances. Appearances by the Risen
Jesus are mentioned by Paul in 1 Cor. 15 and narrated in all the Gospels except
for Mark. 12 Paul's account is at least twenty years after the crucifixion; the
accounts in the Gospels are probably at least thirty years after Paul's, or fifty
years after the event. Not only were these accounts written many years after the
events, but except for Paul's testimony about his own experience, they are not
eyewitness testimony. Let us examine briefly the earliest of these accounts, that
by Paul. Even if what Paul says were a verbatim report of what the eyewitnesses
said, it is not all that helpful in enabling us to understand what they experienced.
According to J Cor. 15, Jesus "appeared to" (or "was seen by") Peter (and
others). What sort of event does the statement refer to? The verb which is used
(ophthe) is patent of many meanings. 13 It is well known that skeptics suggest
that Peter (and the others) were hallucinating. But what is the difference between
a hallucination and a veridical perception of Jesus by Peter? Presumably at least
that the latter involved light rays, which had been reflected off the body of Jesus,
entering Peter's eyes and resulting in the experience of Peter's seeing. Does the
resurrected Jesus have a body which reflects light waves? If not, Peter could not
"see" Jesus in the normal sense. If the body does reflect light waves, then Jesus
would have appeared to anyone else with normal eyesight who had been present
when Jesus appeared and had been looking in the right direction. Would this
have happened? We do not know, and we have no way to know. 14 Thus we do
not know from the verb what is meant, nor do we know from a general understanding of the situation what the term means. Nor does Paul, who also used
the term in relation to his experience of the Risen Lord, tell us, either here or
elsewhere, what that experience was like. (If the accounts in Acts of Paul's
experience of the Risen Jesus are accurate-an admittedly questionable hypothesis-then Paul did not even see Jesus at all, despite Paul's use of ophthe in 1
Cor. 15; all he saw was a light, though he is reported also to have heard a voice.)
Thus, this passage does not show that to say that Jesus appeared means that he
was seen as a normal person or physical object is seen. (I do not claim that he
was not so seen, only that we do not have good grounds for thinking that he
was so seen.)
Some Gospel accounts are more full. Some of them seem to imply that the
writer (and presumably the community of which he was a part) understood the
resurrection to involve Jesus' having a physical body (though even here there
are problems-sometimes he cannot be recognized until the disciples' eyes "are
opened," and the body seems able to pass through closed doors, and only one
Evangelist deals with the question of what happened to the body of the Risen
Lord). 15 But the major problems concern the historical reliability of the accounts
of post-resurrection appearances. Entirely apart from the question of whether
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nonnatural events can occur, many New Testament scholars find ample reasons
for doubting the historical reliability of these accounts. I6 Unfortunately, space
precludes a discussion of these problems here (the interested reader should refer
to the works mentioned in the previous note), but they are sufficient to show
that it is at least not clear that the Gospel writers give historically reliable accounts
of what happened.
Appearance stories are one sort of reason in the tradition for speaking of a
resurrection; the other sort is the empty tomb stories. They probably show
something about the understanding of the resurrection held by those who told
the stories. But what implications they have for the understanding of the resurrection among the very earliest believers-those involved in the Easter event at
about the time of that event~epends on when the stories of the empty tomb
originated. And on this issue there is disagreement. Werner Kummel argues that
they are relatively late; Hugh Anderson reaches the same conclusion and cites
other concurring experts. Marxsen thinks the idea of the empty tomb to be an
"externalization" or "interpretation" in visual terms of an already existing faith
in the resurrection, but he does not think the evidence enables us to determine
whether it entered the tradition early or late; Fuller, on the other hand, believes
that it entered the tradition early and that the disciples "welcomed it as congruous
with the resurrection faith. "17 Given this diversity of expert opinion, we cannot
with any confidence use the empty tomb stories as a basis for concluding how
those involved in the Easter event understood the resurrection.
In this section, I have been arguing that our sources do not allow us to
reconstruct with any confidence how the eyewitnesses understood the resurrection. Is I have not argued that Davis' understanding (or any other understanding)
of the resurrection is clearly incorrect. For if I am right about the sources, no
such argument about Davis' understanding can be made; on the other hand, if
I am right about the sources, Davis also cannot show that his understanding
conforms to that of the eyewitnesses. Moreover, even if one could show that
one's understanding agreed with theirs, showing that their understanding corresponded with what had happened would involve another step. Let me suggest
briefly what further problems this would involve.
At the base of all these problems perhaps lies the claim by many contemporary
biblical scholars that the biblical documents provide dubious grounds for reconstructing the events of Jesus' career. 19 Most of them would claim that the accounts
we have of his career were elaborated, after his death, in ways that reflect and
express the faith of the Christian community; therefore, while certain incidents
in his career are very certain, others are doubtful. I have already indicated some
of the doubts about the meaning and the historical reliability of some of the
post-resurrection narratives. Scholars who reach these conclusions do not intend
thereby to impugn the honesty or intelligence of the biblical writers; rather, they
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claim that our modem understanding of historiography simply did not exist
among the New Testament writers (or among their secular contemporaries either,
for that matter). Rather than seeing the documents as unreliable (and therefore
unsuccessful) histories, these scholars see them as reliable (and therefore successful) expressions of faith. This understanding of the aim and achievement of the
New Testament writers is the result of decades of detailed analysis of the documents. With respect to the Gospels, in particular, it is the result of detailed
analyses of each of the Gospels and a comparison of the Gospels with each
other; in this way, the interests of each Evangelist can be discerned and conclusions drawn about how he handled the traditions on which he based his writing.
It is neither possible nor necessary to go into these analyses here; suffice it to
say that they do not in general presuppose naturalism. 20
Among these scholars there is general agreement that the earliest stratum of
the tradition regarding the appearances consisted simply of the claim that Jesus
appeared to Peter (and perhaps to others). But it did not contain narratives of
the appearances; these came later. 21 These narratives expressed the faith of the
community, but we have no basis for concluding that they are historically accurate
accounts of even what the people named in them would say, to say nothing of
their being accurate accounts of the events. Thus, all that the historian of today
can reliably conclude is that certain first-century Christians said that Jesus
appeared to certain people. And I have already indicated that we cannot be sure
how those to whom he appeared would have described the appearances. Finally,
even if we had access to first-hand accounts by the recipients of these appearances,
the historian would have to assess the probability that their understanding was
accurate; in the absence of such accounts, this cannot be done.
What about the empty tomb narratives? I admitted that they probably involve
the idea that something unusual happened to the body. But is this tradition
relatively early or late? If we cannot answer this question with historical reliability,
then we cannot claim with historical reliability that certain women claimed that
the tomb was empty. But even if the historian could show on good historical
grounds that some women had claimed that the tomb was empty, could he go
any further? Could he show that the women were reliable witnesses? How? He
does not know how long after the crucifixion they first made this claim, how
many made this claim, under what circumstances they made it, how closely their
accounts agreed, what they stood to gain or lose by making the claim, etc.
Sometimes a different sort of argument is attempted regarding the empty tomb:
it is said that the tomb must have been empty; otherwise, when the resurrectionand the empty tomb--were proclaimed on Pentecost, it would have been easy
for the opponents of Jesus' followers to go to the tomb and produce the body,
thus silencing the new movement decisively. But this argument assumes that
Acts gives us a historically reliable account of events right after Jesus' death-an
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assumption which many New Testament scholars would dispute (again for reasons
which have nothing to do with naturalism). Certainly, by the time the Gospels
were written, it was believed within the Christian community (and, to judge by
Matt 28:11-15, evidently by at least some of their Jewish opponents) that the
tomb was empty. But this does not enable the historian to conclude that the
claim about the empty tomb was made in the days shortly after the crucifixion.
We must beware of reading back into a time which lacked modern critical
techniques our contemporary methods of, and interest in, checking and challenging claims which today are employed by neutral and even hostile audiences.
If it is said that those who believed in the resurrection must have believed in
the empty tomb, it should be replied that this assumes that the very earliest
believers in the resurrection understood it to involve an empty tomb--and this
is part of what needs to be proved. 22 For my claim in this section of the paper
is precisely that we do not have a historically reliable account of what the very
earliest believers in the resurrection understood it to involve.
The argument of this section draws heavily on contemporary conclusions about
the origin and interpretation of various New Testament documents. However,
as r indicated above, some conservative New Testament scholars would challenge
these conclusions and would contend that the Gospels intended and achieved a
much higher degree of historical reliability than that involved in my argument.
Does their challenge undermine my argument against Davis? I think not. For
Davis' claim is that belief in the resurrection (in his sense) is rationally justified.
But he also admits that even the supernaturalist should require very strong
evidence before believing that a nonnatural event has occurred. (And I would
add that to give up on this requirement is to open oneself to uncritical credulity
about claims about the occurrence of nonnatural events made by the ignorant
and the deceitful.) Thus, insofar as the biblical materials are part of that evidence,
the case for an understanding of them which would support the rationality of
believing in the resurrection in Davis' sense must be very strong; this seems to
me to imply that in relation to passages used to conclude that a hard miracle has
occurred, the conservative view of the documents must be very much better
supported than alternative views. In other words, in relation to other views of
these passages the conservative view must not only be an alternative with some
prima facie plausibility; it must be shown to be very likely. No defense of the
rationality of believing in the resurrection as a hard miracle is adequate unless
this is shown. But given where the burden of proof lies, my case against Davis'
view does not require showing that the conservative view is highly unlikely. My
case requires only that there be reasons to doubt the historical reliability of the
Easter stories which do not rest on naturalistic assumptions. I believe that I have
shown this.
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Is It Rational to Believe That God Has Caused a Nonnatural Event?
In the previous section I argued that one cannot derive from the biblical
documents sufficient historically reliable information to provide rational justification for the belief that the resurrection in Davis' sense occurred. But even if
the evidence were much stronger than I believe it to be, evidence of another sort
would be required to complete the case for the belief that God had acted in the
Easter event in a nonnaturalistic way. The other sort of evidence would be
evidence that God has in the past acted in nonnatural events for similar ends.23
(Given the same evidence that Nero or Hitler--or even, as Davis asks, John
Lennon-had risen from the dead, would the same supernaturalists who believe
that God resurrected Jesus also believe that God resurrected Nero and Hitler and
Lennon?) This sort of evidence is required because a miracle is more than just
an event which seems to defy naturalistic explanation; it is an event brought
about in some special way by God. And we need some reason other than just
the nonnatural ness of the event to justify the claim that God brought it about;
this other reason would be the event's fitting into (what we take to be) a pattern
of divine activity. We need a pattern of activity because we identify God (a
non-bodied agent) in terms of his purposes as revealed in his deeds;24 and unless
some of the events in the pattern are nonnatural, the task of defending the
rationality of believing in the occurrence of one particular nonnatural event (e.g.,
the resurrection) is complicated by the need to explain why it is the only nonnatural
event.
The belief that God has acted to interrupt natural processes for certain purposes
amounts to a particular religious world-view (though it may not be well developed
or well articulated). But if this framework is essential to determining the rationality
of believing that God raised Jesus, then one cannot determine that belief in the
resurrection of Jesus is rational without also determining that it is rational to
believe in the tradition that God has acted in certain ways for certain ends. 25
I think that Davis might agree with this point,26 but I am not sure that he
appreciates its implications for the rationality of belief in the resurrection. Does
God intervene in nonnaturalistic ways for the sort of ends which Christians
understand to be the purpose of the resurrection? Not can God do so, but does
God do so? Has God done so in the past? What is the evidence that God has?
Davis does not say, but I presume that he would cite Scriptural accounts of
God's other miraculous actions. If he would, then the assessment of the rationality
of the belief in Jesus' resurrection is not independent of the assessment of the
rationality of the belief in other nonnatural events. But here we must take note
of the fact that the historically reliable factual evidence for any other nonnatural
event in the Scriptures is probably no stronger and in most cases weaker than
the evidence for Jesus' resurrection, yet we have seen that this evidence is itself
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not strong enough. But belief in these other events is necessary to provide the
context within which it is rational to believe that God does act nonnaturally for
the ends which Davis understands the Easter event to manifest; apart from this
context, there would be no justification for taking the Easter event to be an
action of God, however much it might defy naturalistic explanation.
This necessity for belief in other nonnatural events in which God has acted
would also apply to first-century Christians. In this context it is significant that
Davis claims that first-century Christians tended to explain most events naturalistically just as we do today. He does not defend this claim, but I suspect that
any defense would rest on an equation of the first-century distinction between
ordinary events and mighty works, signs, wonders, etc. with our contemporary
distinction between natural and nonnatural events. If this is the right way to
understand their concepts, then it is probable that the number of nonnatural
events which they believed occurred in their everyday lives and within their
observation was far greater than the number in which we believe today. This
would have made it easier and perhaps more rational for them to understand
what they experienced and were told relating to the Easter event as pointing to
a nonnatural event than it would be for us to do so today. Thus, even if Davis
is right that first-century Christians tended to explain most events naturalistically,
there are important differences between their context and ours that affect the
degree to which it is rational for them and for us to believe that a particular
event was nonnatural.
But there is a much more serious problem with making the comparison between
first-century Christians and us today which Davis suggests. The comparison
assumes that first-century Christians had (at least roughly) the same concepts of
miracles and of naturalistic and nonnaturalistic explanation as we have today,
but it is virtually certain that they did not. They lacked the concept of nature
and of natural law which is presupposed in Davis' concept of miracles.27 Not
surprisingly, therefore, there is no New Testament concept (or Old Testament
concept, for that matter) corresponding to our concept of 'miracle.' The New
Testament uses four terms which might be connected with miracles in our sense:
dunameis (mighty deeds), semeia (signs), terata (}t'onders-often used in conjunction with signs), and erga (works). But none of these terms necessarily involves
a nonnatural event in our sense; instead, they indicate some event in which God's
activity is seen. 28 Thus, instead of our distinction between events which are
explained naturalistically and those which are explained nonnaturalistically, New
Testament Christians employed a distinction between events in which God was
manifested and those in which God was not. Therefore, it is highly questionable
to draw the conclusion that an event was a miracle in our sense on the grounds
that first-century Christians called it a mighty deed, sign, etc.
But suppose that we have no good evidence for a nonnatural event prior to
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the Easter event. Why could it not have been the first such event for which we
have good evidence') (Presumably if there are any such events for which we
have evidence that makes it rational for us to believe that they occurred, there
must have been some first such event.) Why might not the Easter event be the
first clear evidence that God does act in these ways and thus initiate a tradition
in which we find other instances of God's acting in these ways? Aside from the
fact that Christians traditionally have not understood the Easter event as marking
this sort of a radical innovation in God's activity, this suggestion seems to me
to create more problems than support for Davis' understanding of the Easter
event. How often do rational, critical Christians today claim that they have
observed God acting nonnaturalistically in their own times? I know of few, if
any.29 And this must inevitably prompt the question: why does not God sometimes
so act in events which we can observe? If God really does on occasion act so
as to produce a hard miracle, why do we not observe it? Our failure to observe
hard miracles on occasions when our understanding of God's purposes suggests
that they would be appropriate or to be expected (e.g., stopping the holocaust)
must suggest (though not prove) that God does not so act. To be sure, it can be
replied that we do not understand all of God's purposes, that God's ways are
not our ways, etc. And if the problem were just the occasional non-occurrence
of hard miracles when they might be expected, this answer would be adequate.
But our problem is that they (apparently) never occur. If not, why not? Again,
I claim that our repeated failure to observe their occurrence must be taken as
some reason to think that they do not occur.'"
But am I being too hasty in claiming that rational Christians today do not
claim that God is producing nonnatural events in their lives? This might seem
to be simply an empirical question to be answered by sociologists. Surely some
contemporary Christians say that God has done things in their lives. But are they
claiming that the events in question are nonnatural events? In most cases, I
suspect that the issue does not even arise in those tenns. An event occurred in
which the person sees "the hand of God"; perhaps it was an event for which the
person had prayed. In such contexts, no one (or almost no one) will ask whether
the event was a nonnatural event. But if somehow the issue did arise and if
someone were to claim that the event is a nonnatural event, are they being
rational when they say this? That is a matter which is more difficult for sociologists
to determine and one which we cannot attempt to answer in this paper. 31 Here
I will simply record the fact that I know of no Christian who rationally claims
that God has produced a clearly nonnatural event in his life or within the range
of his experience.
The absence of any clearly nonnatural events today, even in circumstances in
which our understanding of God's purposes might lead us to expect them, raises
problems for the view that God occasionally brings them about. To avoid any
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misunderstanding, let me admit at the outset that I find no logical incoherence
in the view that most events happen in accordance with natural causality but that
occasionally God produces a nonnatural event, one which does not accord with
natural causality. But though this is not an incoherent position, I wonder what
reason there might be for holding it. One might, I guess, hold the position for
no reason other than that it is a logical possibility. But this would hardly be
reason enough to make one's holding the position rational, for there are other
logical possibilities to~.g., that natural causality always obtains ,that it seldom
obtains, etc. Which of these possibilities shall we believe characterizes the actual
world, and why shall we believe that possibility rather than another characterizes
this world? I presume that if we rationally believe that natural causality does not
always obtain, we must have in mind some instance or instances when (we
believe) it has not obtained and some reason(s) to believe that it has not obtained
in these instances.
What are these instances? I argued earlier in the paper that we do not have
adequate reason to believe that the resurrection was such an event. I would add
that we lack historically reliable evidence that any other event mentioned in the
Bible is clearly nonnatural. 32 I have also claimed that we do not have strong
evidence for clearly nonnatural events in our own lives or in the lives of others
in our own time. Here again I take it that the burden of proof is on someone
who would disagree with me. Such a person would have to cite events which
are clearly nonnatural. If no clearly nonnatural events can be cited in biblical
events or in our own lives, how can it be rational to believe that they actually
occur, not just are possible?"
In this way one might come to naturalism as a conclusion based on the lack
of clear-cut evidence for nonnatural events. I would repeat that I do not think
that such evidence is in principle unobtainable; I just know of none. As I said
earlier, the difficulty with believing that occasional nonnatural events occur is
not a logical difficulty: we can always believe that they occur somewhere. But
if we are rationally to believe that some nonnatural events occur, we must have
in mind some events which we believe are nonnatural events. And they must be
clearly nonnatural events if we are to be rational in believing that nonnatural
events occur, for (as even Davis insists) our predisposition should be toward
giving a naturalistic explanation of events whenever possible.
Does the previous paragraph show me at last in my true colors as what Davis
would call "basically naturalist"? (In fact, I am not; I share with the process
thinkers mentioned earlier a rejection of the sharp distinction between natural
and nonnatural events.) Even if it did, I do not think that would be relevant to
my case against the rationality of believing that the resurrection in Davis' sense
occurred. For that case rested on reasons which do not presuppose naturalism.
To recapitulate briefly, I suggested that, assuming that there is a God who
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could interfere with natural processes, the factors which would make rational a
belief in Jesus' resurrection in Davis' sense would be (I) the factual evidence
for details about the event which would provide a rational basis for thinking it
to be a nonnatural event and (2) evidence that God has on other occasions
interfered with natural processes for similar purposes. In the previous section I
argued that the factual evidence that the resurrection event occurred as Davis
understands it is not very strong. This is not to say that the evidence provides
strong support for any alternative reconstruction of that event; it simply does not
provide strong evidence for any view of the event. And in this section I have
raised what I consider to be serious difficulties with the second factor. Let me
reemphasize that my doubts about this second factor are not based on some
presumption about the inviolability of natural law. Rather they are based on the
weakness of the historical evidence for any hard miracles in the biblical documents
and the absence of such events in our own lives. An given Davis' principle
(which I accept) that rational people will require very strong evidence before
they believe that a miracle has occurred, 1 do not find it rational to believe that
the resurrection was a hard miracle.
The foregoing may not prove conclusively that it is not rational for a contemporary Christian to believe that the resurrection occurred in Davis' sense, but I
do think that it shows that even for a supernaturalist it is more difficult to show
that such a belief is rational than Davis' article suggests. Furthermore, I think
it helps to explain why a person might try to be a Christian, a follower of Christ
and one who understands God's purposes and will to be as Christ proclaimed
and exemplified, and still rationally doubt that the resurrection in Davis' sense
occurred. I regard the attempt to do this and therefore to develop an alternative
understanding of the resurrection as not necessarily an uncritical following of
contemporary naturalism, but at least sometimes as the result of an honest effort
to come to terms with the Christian Scriptures in light of all we can learn.
Wofford College

NOTES
1. Stephen T. Davis, "Is It Possihle to Know That Jesus Was Raised from the Dead"" Faith and
Philosophy, I, 2 (April 1984), 147-59. Page numbers in parentheses in the text refer to this article.
2. I must stress that I am claiming that it is in Davis' sense of the resurrection that they constitute
a bar to believing rationally that the resurrection occurred. I make no claims about other senses in
which the resurrection has been understood. Similarly, when I refer in the title to doubts ahout the
resurrection, I mean douhts ahout the resurrection in Davis' sense.
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3. Davis says that "rational people will require very strong evidence indeed before they will believe
that a miracle has occurred" (p. 148). He also indicates his sympathy with those who would require
very strong evidence before they believed reports that a building had levitated or that John Lennon
had been resurrected (p. 158).
4. In the above quotation Davis speaks of Jones' recovery being due to God, Davis does not
explicate in what sense it is due to God, but presumably it must be something more than God's
ordinary maintenance of the natural order.
5. This is not the place to go into this very complex matter. But is is worth noting here that the
inability to explicate this distinction was one of the major reasons for the decline of the biblical
theology movement of the 1950s and 1960s; see Langdon B. Gilkey, "Cosmology, Ontology, and
the Travail of Biblical Language," Journal of Religion, XLI (July 1961), 194-205. It might also be
worth mentioning that other theistic ontologies can explicate a clear sense in which God acts in
historical events without presupposing this sort of sharp distinction between miraculous and nonmiraculous events; e.g., in process theologies God is a partial cause of every event-more of some
than of others-and there is no sharp line between ordinary events and miraculous events. Can it
really be that the biblical materials require us to assume the correctness of an ontology which makes
the sort of sharp distinction which Davis' approach involves?
6. Davis might object that I am biasing the case in favor of a naturalistic understanding of the
resurrection by not assuming that God has interfered with natural processes in some events. I might
reply with a tu quoque; his version of supernaturalism biases the case in favor of supernaturalistic
understanding. But Davis might well admit this and point out that he insisted that one's world-view
shaped one's understanding of the resurrection; that is why it is rational for some people to believe
in the resurrection, but not others. So I would prefer to answer that each of the other events which
allegedly involve a hard miracle would also have to be examined. I would claim about each of them,
as I claim about the resurrection, that there is no good historical evidence for the occurrence of an
event which would be a hard miracle. And I would make this claim about the evidence, not because
the event could not have happened as recorded, but because there is good reason to doubt details
of the occurrence on the grounds of canons of historiography of the sort mentioned above. This sort
of reason to doubt that a hard miracle has occurred is not based on the assumption of naturalism
(though it may involve the sort of predisposition toward a naturalistic explanation which even Davis
regards as legitimate), and it has nothing to do with whether or not miracles occurred in other events.
However, as we shall see, the case for a miracle in one event cannot be completely divorced from
the issue of whether or not it is rational to believe that miracles have occurred in other events (though
it normally can he divorced from anyone other particular event). Having good evidence for a
miraculous intervention by God in some other events makes it more rational to believe that it has
occurred in the event in question. But what could this good evidence be other than other well
documented events which involved hard miracles? And 50 the documentation of these events would
require careful scrutiny.
7. For example, suppose that we discovered that everyone whose early occupation was carpentry
but who became an itinerant preacher in his late twenties and who was put to death by the authorities
came back to life and then in a few days floated up out of human sight. Jesus' re5urrcction would
be an instance of an event explained by this law. Would Davis really be satisfied with this explanation
of Je&us' resurrection'?
8. An example of such a person would be Peter at and shortly after the time when Jesus appeared
to him (if the tradition about the order of the appearances in I Cor. 15 is reliable, as it is generally
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thought to be).
9. Here it might be worth noting a related point about a historiographically unjustified practice of
some Christians today. When they read some portion of the New Testament, often they do so with
the rest of the New Testament in mind as a context and as a basis for interpreting the passage being
read. This procedure is historiographically suspect because for many parts of the New Testament
neither the author nor his original readers knew about any other portions of the New Testament.
Thus, we cannot simply assume that every New Testament writer who spoke of the resurrection
understood it as did every other New Testament author; even less can we assume this of every
believer mentioned by a New Testament writer. Of course, they all may have understood it in the
same way, but this must be shown, not assumed. Thus, we must be careful about reading into early
accounts of the resurrection something which dates from a later period in the history ofthe tradition.
10. The view that the inference is based solely on the claims about the appearances is a common
view, at least among scholars other than conservative ones. Cf., e.g., Werner Georg Kiimmel, The
Theology of the New Testament, tf. John Steely (New York: Abingdon Press, 1973), pp. 98-99 and
Hugh Anderson Jesus and Christian Origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 192-95.
Willi Marxsen traces all the resurrection stories back to the claim that Peter believed and "the
assertion of the early church that this faith was grounded on the seeing of Jesus" (The Resurrection
of Jesus of Nazareth, tf. Margaret Kohl [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970], p. 96). Even Reginald
H. Fuller, though he does not believe that the empty tomb stories derive from the appearance stories,
says that "for the disciples, faith in the resurrection did not rest upon the empty tomb, but upon
their revelatory encounters with the Risen One" (The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives, rev.
ed. [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980], p. 171).
II. Paul might seem to be an exception to this statement. But we do not have any description by
Paul of the Risen Jesus. Paul does claim to have seen the Risen Jesus, but he never describes what
he saw or what the experience was like. There is a description in Acts, but that is not by Paul. I
Cor. 15:35-50 is a metaphorical account of what a resurrected body is like, but it is not-and does
not purport to be-a description of the resurrected Jesus; moreover, it was written about twenty
years after Paul's encounter with the Risen Jesus.
12. As is well known, our best text of Mark ends at 16:8. The remaining verses 9-20, which appear
in some late manuscripts and which are printed in some English translations, are not part of the
original. Whether Mark's original had additional verses after 16:8 is uncertain. No textual evidence
for them exists in our best ancient manuscripts. The major reasons for suspecting that there were
originally other verses is that 16:8 would make a somewhat abrupt ending and that the other Gospels
contain appearance stories. But Mark also begins abruptly. And the comparison with the other
Gospels must be used with care, particularly if the point under discussion is the history of the origin
and transmission of the appearance stories. Perhaps Mark ended with 16:8 because the appearance
stories were not used in his community.
13. See the entry under horao in William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon
of the New Testament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). Cf. also Marxsen, op. cit., p.
98. Any more specific proposal about the meaning of the term cannot be the basis for an understanding
of the resurrection; on the contrary, it has to be based on some understanding of the resurrection
derived from some other source, as is illustrated by Fuller's proposal, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
14. That it was later reported that Jesus appeared to over 500 at once docs not show that the Risen
Jesus could be seen by anyone who was present at the right time and looking in the right direction.
We know too little about the event to draw this conclusion from the report. By then the story about
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the appearance to Peter was known among Christians. Perhaps some one or two persons there might
have claimed that Jesus was appearing to them and then others gradually joined in, not wanting to
seem to lack faith or insight. Moreover, it is noteworthy that neither here nor any place else in the
New Testament is it said that the Risen Jesus appeared to anyone who remained an unbeliever; and
Paul is the only one who is said to have been an unbeliever at the time of the appearance.
15. The fact that only one Evangelist feels it necessary to discuss what happened to the body of the
Risen Jesus is surely curious if the Evangelists all understood the resurrection to involve Jesus'
having a physical body. For the others did not expect that their readers would refer to Luke's Gospel
to find out what happened to the body. Yet if they (and their readers) understood it to be a physical
body, it would seem that they would have to say something about where that body is now.
16. It is interesting that Willi Marxsen, op. cit., pp. 21-22, to name only one, explicitly rejects
naturalism as a criterion for New Testament interpretation and criticism. His The Resurrection of
Jesus of Nazareth lays out his method of argument very nicely; at no point does he reject a passage
or propose an interpretation because of trouble with an event which seems to require a nonnaturalistic
explanation. Rather, his approach may be briefly summarized as follows:
I. He notes that the narratives of the post-Easter events in the four Gospels do not agree. He
concludes that not only would each be at best incomplete if it were intended as a history, but
that they cannot be harmonized in detail (pp. 71-74).
2. He compares the changes which Matthew and Luke made in Mark (which they knew), and
compares the tendencies revealed in changes made in these Gospel's treatments of pre-Easter
events. Thus he concludes that certain theological purposes shaped the narratives.
3. Finally, he points out that the post-Easter stories (like the rest of the Gospels) circulated as
individual stories before they were gathered and put into written form. Then he tries to reconstruct
the history of these stories and to get at their earliest versions.
Marxsen admits that the result of using this approach is only a hypothesis, to be judged by how
well it accounts for the evidence. But he insists that any other account of the earliest versions of
the traditions is also a hypothesis. I would add that the debate between naturalism and supernaturalism
is irrelevant to deciding between the competing hypotheses.
Marxsen's analysis of the Gospel accounb of the resurrection appearances is found on pp. 36-78;
on pp. 79-97, he attempts to reconstruct the history of the tradition prior to the writing of the Gospels.
Other analyses of the Gospel accounts of the appearances which question their historical reliability
for reasons which have nothing to do with naturalistic assumptions may be found in Kiimmel, op.
cit., pp. 96-105; Anderson, op. cit., pp. 185-240; and Fuller, op. cit., pp. 50-154.
17. Kiimmel, op. cit., pp. 98-99. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 192-9';. Marxsen, op. cit., p. 161. Fuller,
op. cit., p. 171. But even Fuller does not think that the disciples checked on the women's story (p.

171); cf. Fuller's analysis of the accounts of the disciples going to the tomb in Lk. 24:12 (pp.
100-103). One major problem for those who think that the empty tomb stories are early is Paul's
failure to mention the empty tomb in I Cor. 15 when he was arguing so vigorously for the resurrection.
Either he did not know the stories or he did not think them worth mentioning. The latter seems
inexplicable, and the former is very unlikely if the stories are early.
18. It might be suggested that we should understand the term 'resurrection' in the sense which it
had in Palestine in Jesus' day. But there are two problems with this suggestion. First, it has been
argued that the term had more than one sense in Palestine at that time (Marxsen, op. cit., pp. 130-37,
especially p. 136). Second, though Christians did choose the term 'resurrection' to express their
idea, that does not mean that it had exactly the same sense which it bore in non-Christian contexts.
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To take an analogy, Christians gave a distinctive sense to agape, but they nowhere pointed out that
they were doing this. Rather, we can determine that they gave agape a distinctive sense by comparing
how they used it with how non-Christians used it. To do this, however, requires that we have a
clear idea of how Christians used it, and as I have argued, we cannot determine what those involved
in the Easter event understood the resurrection to involve.
19. Admittedly, there are (conservative) scholars who dispute this claim and the analyses on which
it is based. Later I shall ask what difference their disagreement makes.
20. For example, see the outline of Marxsen's method given in note 16 above. At the level of
generality in that note, his method is typical of many New Testament scholars.
21. Cf., e.g., Fuller's claim (op. cit., p. 66) that the assumption that Mark had appearance stories
at his disposal "ought to be questioned," for "the earliest church did not narrate resurrection appearances, but proclaimed the resurrection."
22. Did Paul understand the resurrection to involve an empty tomb? If so, his failure to mention it
in I Cor. 15 (when he was arguing for the resurrection) is perplexing.
23. I say "similar," not "identical," or we could never admit that God does anything new. Thus, I
am not suggesting (hat there must be evidence for previous resurrections, each of which indicates
God had reconciled the world to himself. But there should be evidence that God had acted non naturally
in certain previous events to do things like redeem people or reveal himself to have the sort of
intentions which are manifested in raising Je<,us. (It is logically possible that the resurrection was
the first nonnatural event and served as the beginning of a wholly new way of understanding God.
This possibility is at variance with any recognizable Christian view, but we shall discuss it later.)
24. This point is well argued in Thomas F. Tracy, God. Action. and Embodiment (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1984), pp. 75-80. Of course, as Tracy points out, it is
possible to identify God as an agent by a logically individuating description (e.g., the creator of
heaven and earth): but as he also points out, only identifying God as the agent in a pattern of events
will "give our talk of God some concrete content" (p. 76). This concrete content is needed if talk
of God is to be religiously significant. and I take it that the matters under discussion in Davis' paper
and mine are intended to be religiously significant.
25. Given this principle, someone might well ask how any such tradition could get started. For it
must begin with a first miraculous event, and there would be no tradition prior to that event. The
rationality of belief in the miraculousness of the first event would be assessed in light of later
miraculous events, in which God is seen to act in similar ways and for similar purposes. Later I
shall discuss briefly the possibility that the resurrection itself might be such a first event.
26. He agrees that "rational expectation of what will happen is based on our best available knowledge
of what has happened" (p. 148. his italics).
27. On their lack of these concepts, see S. V. McCasland, "Miracles," Interpreter's Dictionarv of
the Bible, ed, George Buttrick et, al. (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), Vol. III, p. 397.
28. This point is a commonplace among most biblical scholars. For instance, S. V. McCasland
writes of miracles in the biblical sense: "A miracle is not necessarily an event outside nature or in
violation of its laws, but is any occurrence whatever which arouses a feeling of awe, amazement,
terror, or wonder, and causes the one who beholds it to see, not merely the phenomenon of nature,
but God, whose being it expresses" (ibid" p. 398). McCasland's conclusion is all the more significant
since he believes that miracles in Davis' sense do occur: thus, his claim about the biblical concept
cannot be challenged on the grounds that he is a naturalist whose presuppositions have biased his
conclusions (though his conclusions might of course be challenged on philological or other grounds).
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It is worth noting too that in his article on "Signs and Wonders" in the Interpreter's Dictionary of
the Bible, B, W, Anderson agrees very closely with McCasland: "In the biblical sense, then, a
miracle is an unusual, marvelous event which testifies to God's active presence in the world, This

does not mean, however, that the miracle is a disruption of the natural order, which, according to
the modern understanding, is governed by the law of cause and effect" (VoL IV, p. 348). An
examination of the references to biblical passages given in these articles shows that some events
which we would regard as very ordinary natural events could be regarded as instances of these
concepts--e.g., the prophet Isaiah and his family could be regarded as "a sign and a wonder" (Isa.
8: 18).

29. It is interesting that the rate at which saints have been canonized in the Roman Catholic Church
has dropped markedly in our century. Is this because we have fewer saintly people-an admitted
possibility-{)r because there are fewer claimed miracles which even in the view of the appropriate
authorities in that church can be confirmed?
30. It might be suggested that it was appropriate for God to perform a hard miracle in connection
with Jesus to get Christianity started, but that now no hard miracles are needed, for we have the
testimony to what God did then. But if it is important to believe that the resurrection in Davis' sense
occurred, why did not God cause it to be better attested'! And why should those who had experienced
the purported hard miracle be in an epistemically privileged relation to God and his activity? Why
should they, and they alone, be witnesses to a hard miracle?
31. Consider the difficulties in rationally believing (or claiming) that a nonnatural event occurred.
Suppose we knew of an event which we were inclined to think might be a nonnatural event. To
determine whether or not it really was a nonnatural event we must determine whether there occurred
in it some sequence which did not occur in accordance with natural processes. But to do this, we
must both understand the relevant natural processes well and know in detail what sequences occurred.
The better we understand the natural processes and the more detail wc know about what sequences
occurred, the more clearly a nonnatural event would stand out if one occurred. But does anyone
who understands the processes and knows the sequences well claim that a nonnatural event occurred')
J admit that someone might do this and might do it with good reason-that is a logical possibility.
I just don't know of anyone who does. Thus I claim that there are no clear-cut evidences of nonnatural
events occurring in the lives of people today.
32. Space limitations preclude any argument for this claim in the paper, but here again I have the
support of much modern biblical scholarship; moreover, the burden of proof rests with the person
who would claim that one of the biblical events is clearly nonnatural. I think even Davis would
agree on that matter.
33. Here we confront again a major difference between ourselves and first-century Christians. Neither
in our history (except for the resurrection, which is the case in point, and certain other biblical
events, whose historical details are, r would claim, not reliably ascertainable) nor in our own lives
do we find it rational to believe in the occurrence of nonnatural events (though we may find it
rational to believe in the occurrence of miraculous events in some other sense). Thus, the context
within which we understand the Easter event is very different from that in which first-century
Christians thought about it.

